Talk to me like Lawyers do: Celmer returns to the High Court of Ireland by Bracken, Cillian
Talk to me like Lawyers do – Celmer
returns to the High Court of Ireland
Cillian Bracken 2018-09-07T19:02:23
Much of the commentary on this blog has related to both the case of and fallout
from Case C 216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (‘LM’) before the
CJEU. Now, the case is back before the High Court of Ireland, which gave a further
judgment on 01 August 2018. Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer (No 4)
[2018] IEHC 484 (‘Celmer’) is interesting on multiple levels, not least as it provides
the first domestic interpretation and application of the CJEU’s decision and is useful
for its insight into its practical implementation. Most notably, the Irish High Court has
indicated that it will enter into dialogue with the Polish judicial authorities by referring
questions on the specific substantiated concerns raised regarding access to an
independent tribunal.
The Decision of the CJEU
The specific facts and background of the CJEU decision can be read in detail
elsewhere. In a nutshell, the CJEU held that the power to suspend Council
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA rests with the European Council. Nevertheless,
the executing judicial authority of a Member State may refrain from giving effect of
a European arrest warrant if there exists a real risk that the requested person will
suffer a breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal. This involves
a two-stage assessment: first, the executing authority must assess, on the basis
of objective and reliable material whether there is a real risk connected with a lack
of independence of the courts of that Member State on account of systemic or
generalised deficiencies. Secondly, if the executing authority is satisfied there are
such deficiencies, it must assess specifically and precisely whether in the particular
circumstances of the case there are substantial grounds for believing that the
requested person will run that real risk.
Interpreting the CJEU’s Decision
When the case returned before the Irish High Court and Donnelly J. on 30 July 2018,
the Respondent, Mr. Celmer, and the Applicant, the Minister for Justice and Equality,
disagreed on what was the proper interpretation of the judgment. Particularly, the
disagreement concerned the sequencing of the process of the second part of the
LM test, regarding the specific and precise assessment of whether the Respondent
is at real risk, as well as the nature of any consequential evidential burden on the
Respondent. To that end, Donnelly J. sought to determine from the LM judgment
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whether she should seek supplementary information form the Polish issuing
authorities for assessing whether there is a real risk to the Respondent.
Referring to the CJEU’s judgment, Donnelly J. stressed that the right to a fair trial
is of cardinal importance as a guarantee for the protection of all the rights which
individuals derive from EU law and is a value common to the Member States and
then proceeded with an assessment of the situation in Poland. First, she relied on
materials from the initial case, such as the Art. 7 TEU proceedings when she had
made the preliminary reference, and found that the first stage of the LM test was
fulfilled as there was indeed a real risk of the fundamental right to a fair trial being
breached, connected with a lack of independence of the courts of Poland on account
of systemic or generalised deficiencies there. Secondly, she then turned to the
specific and precise determination in order to ascertain whether in this particular
case there are substantial grounds for believing that the Respondent will run a real
risk of breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal, and therefore of
the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial. To do so, per the CJEU, the Court
had to assess whether the extent to which the systemic or generalised deficiencies
regarding the independence of Poland’s courts are liable to have an impact at the
level of the State’s courts with jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the specific
individual concerns expressed by the Respondent.
Implementing the CJEU’s Decision
On this second stage of the test, the parties differed in their interpretation of the
CJEU’s judgment with regard to the steps involved in the specific and precise
assessment. Before the CJEU, the Respondent had submitted that he did not
have to have specific and precise circumstances applicable to him. This having
been rejected by the CJEU, he now contended that the nature of the assessment
required by the CJEU was whether the Respondent would run the risk of being tried
by a court that was not independent. The possibility that very many other persons
appearing in the trial courts ran a real risk of an unfair trial by virtue of the lack of
independence of the courts did not preclude a specific and precise assessment of
a requested person’s situation. With respect to his own situation, the Respondent
first submitted the Court had already made findings related to the ordinary courts in
Poland about the risks to a person appearing before them and how the disciplinary
role of the Polish Minister of Justice over the Presidents of Courts had the potential
for a chilling effect on the administration of justice. Secondly, the Respondent relied
on statements made by Poland’s Deputy Justice Minister in the media, where he
made prejudicial comments referring to the Respondent as “a dangerous” “criminal
sought in the whole of Europe” “from a drug mafia”. The Minister for Justice and
Equality however argued that that it was only after the Court had made a specific
and precise assessment that there were substantial grounds for believing that the
Respondent will be at real risk of breach of his fundamental right to an independent
tribunal, that the Court must seek an assurance from the issuing Member State that
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he is not. Furthermore, the Minister put forward that there was an evidential burden
on a Respondent to put before the Court material that showed he was at real risk.
Donnelly J. held that it was unnecessary to come to a final determination whether
the executing judicial authority may request supplementary information after
the Court had made its specific and precise assessment, as suggested by the
Minister, because the Respondent had provided sufficient information that there
were reasonable grounds for believing that he is at specific risk of being subject
to an unfair trial. Donnelly J. specifically pointed to the irreconcilability of the
Deputy Minister’s statements with the presumption of innocence under Art. 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Directive 2016/343 on the
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to
be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, which binds Poland but not Ireland.
In order to ultimately determine if there were substantial grounds for believing that
this Respondent is at real risk of a breach of his fundamental right to an independent
tribunal and therefore a breach of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair
trial, Donnelly J. found that she should, or even must, elicit additional information.
She therefore held she would enter into dialogue with the issuing judicial authority
in Poland in order to obtain further information. Donnelly J. then invited parties to
submit draft questions for submission to the issuing judicial authority but stressed
that the final decision as to the precise questions to be asked will be entirely that of
the Court.
The emphasis that is being placed on the sequencing of the process for the specific
and precise assessment, as well as the significance of seeking information from the
Polish authorities is important for several reasons. Given the absolute importance
placed on the concept of mutual trust and recognition between Member States,
a cornerstone of judicial cooperation, by virtue both of the common values of the
Treaties and by the Framework Decision, underlined by the CJEU in LM, it is clear
that Donnelly J. is keen to buttress the process of determining whether or not
to execute the EAW against possible criticism, given the ramifications. Further,
Donnelly J. quite obviously is stressing that she has not ultimately come to a
conclusion with regard to the overall assessment of whether or not there exists a
real risk that the requested person will suffer a breach of his fundamental right to
an independent tribunal. She is utilising the information seeking function stipulated
by the CJEU to extend one final opportunity for the Polish authorities to ameliorate
the concerns raised. By doing so she is guarding against any apprehension of
a pre-determined outcome and from a purely pragmatic perspective by allowing
the additional information she receives to feed into her overall assessment, she
is both acknowledging the mutual trust and recognition between Member States
and is ensuring that her overall decision is properly informed, and, perhaps more
critically, is seen to be properly informed. Donnelly J. is alight to the significance and
implications of both this case domestically and LM throughout the Union; therefore,
by sequencing the assessment in this manner and seeking further information she
is particularising the case to the Respondent, rather than letting the genie out of the
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bottle entirely. This is also evidenced by the fact that she explicitly notes that each
case must be dealt with in due course on its own merits and in accordance with the
decision of the CJEU.
Walking on Broken Glass
The judgment provides a fascinating insight into the practical implications of the
CJEU judgment in LM, not least because the Polish government has managed to
hoist itself by its own petard, but also how the assessment of the test laid down is
to be implemented practically. First of all, it will be interesting to see what format
the questions do eventually take. It will be particularly intriguing, however, to see
how the Irish High Court will deal with the assurances provided by the issuing
judicial authority, if any, and whether it will regard them as sufficient to execute the
EAW. There is an overriding sense that these proceedings are just prolonging the
inevitable impasse that will be reached once the Court sends questions to the Polish
issuing judicial authority and the likely inadequate answers that will be returned. As
Matteo Bonelli has written, like the judgment in LM, the Irish court proceedings really
only postpone the constitutional moment, with the pending infringement actions (on
the Ordinary Courts and on the Law on the Supreme Court) and the proceedings
under Article 7 TEU likely to provide the anticipated fireworks. However, they do
have the possibility of becoming a lightning rod once again, should the High Court
refuse the EAW, with the ensuing diplomatic fall out and the potential for EAW
transfers between Poland and Ireland to grind to a halt.
Regardless of the overall picture, the case is instructive insofar as it provides a
concrete methodology for an approach to implementing LM on a domestic level and
will undoubtedly lead to a flurry of litigation in the Irish courts, and perhaps further
abroad, in challenges to EAW issued from Poland. The case provides a welcome,
though incomplete, picture of the post-LM EU.
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